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Chapter 13 – After 1980: collecting societies 
and software copyright 
 
After the Franki Report – the 1980 amendments 
Release of the Franki Report 
In August 1976, two months before publication of the Franki Report, 
the Sydney Morning Herald journalist Gavin Souter summarised the social 
importance and economic implications of photocopying in educational 
institutions. A “boon” to education, the “photocopying revolution” 
had, he wrote, created “a prodigious industry”. One visit to the copying 
room at any university library would persuade the sceptic that a large 
portion of the 16 million copies made in Australian universities were 
reproductions of copyright works. 
According to Souter, the Copyright Agency Limited, authorised to 
collect copyright fees on behalf of 2000 authors, was already active in 
licensing copying. The Department of Humanities at the Footscray 
Institute of Technology agreed to pay CAL one cent for every page 
copied of a book on CAL’s schedule of 1000 works. CAL intended to 
distribute payments between authors and publishers in a ratio, in some 
cases, of 80/20 and in the case of certain textbooks, 50/50. 
Souter’s article sheds revealing light on the views of the ACC as the 
Franki Committee finalised its work. Gus O’Donnell told Souter of a 
meeting between the ACC and the Australian Vice-Chancellors’ 
Committee. “Basically what we told them,” said O’Donnell, “was that 
we don’t think the Franki Report is going to get universities totally off 
the hook. They’re still going to have to come to terms with copyright 
owners, so they should start talking now.” Souter reported that the 
universities replied that “they would wait for Franki.” 
O’Donnell correctly surmised that the Franki Committee intended to 
propose legislation to create liability for educational copying. At the 
same time, his language suggested awareness that the recommendations 
would prove more generous to universities than the ACC wished. The 
universities evidently felt hopeful that the Franki Committee would 
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either dash the ACC’s ambitions or make recommendations that 
obliged them only to contract with authors and publishers individually. 
When released in October 1976, the report attracted little public 
attention and neither the ACC nor the educational sector rushed to 
support or denounce its findings. Both factions seemed to batten down 
the hatches. Both knew that the proposed statutory licensing scheme 
would be difficult for CAL to administer, creating a significant 
administrative burden for universities and a significant policing burden 
for CAL. With the resources of both groups stretched, they could only 
work slowly towards accommodation, and hope to influence the 
politicians who framed the legislation creating the statutory licence. 
The Liberal Coalition Government responded by asking for  
public submissions on the Report and consulting with the  
respondent interest groups. In June 1978, the Attorney General,  
Senator Durack announced that authors would be able to claim 
remuneration for photocopies of their work under legislation to be 
introduced in the following session of Parliament. The author’s fee 
would be negotiated by ‘representatives’ of the author and educational 
institutions. Legislation did not, however, appear in the succeeding four 
sessions of Parliament. 
Statutory licence for educational copying 
Only after the passage of two years, during which the opposed parties 
bent the ear of politicians, did the Government finally introduce 
legislation. Introduced by the Government in September 1980, a 
copyright bill embraced the Franki Committee’s recommendations. The 
ACC’s intensive lobbying efforts failed and the legislation provided for 
the introduction of a statutory licence that permitted educational 
establishments to copy works subject to maintaining copying records. 
Ian Viner, the Minister for Employment and Youth Affairs, who 
introduced the amending bill, said the Government gave “close” 
attention to the ACC’s “alternative” proposals, which envisaged 
voluntary licensing and compulsory income collecting for authors by 
CAL. However, he said, the Government did not wish to place authors 
in a difficult position. They, or their representatives, were free to enter 
into voluntary licensing arrangements but the educational institutions 
could also choose to avail themselves of the statutory licence scheme 
established by the legislation. 
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Importantly, the amending bill introduced procedural improvements 
that refined the Franki Committee’s proposal for a statutory licence 
scheme. Records were to be kept in a form that allowed the copyright 
owner to inspect the records without having to examine the details of 
other copying. The legislation created an offence for failing to maintain 
records in the prescribed form. These improvements cured a major 
weakness of the Committee’s proposal, which failed to identify a 
method of distinguishing between copying under statutory licence and 
other copying provisions of the Act. 
The Opposition Labor Party responded in an equivocal way. In the 
House of Representatives and the Senate, it moved voluminous 
technical amendments to the bill. But its MPs seemed divided over the 
effect of the legislation. Lionel Bowen, the Shadow Attorney General, 
noted that Australia was a net importer of copyright products and 
much of the income collected in Australia on behalf of owners would 
be sent overseas.  
Users and the little people 
Bowen observed that the Labor Party believed that “the users of 
copyright have been unjustifiably disadvantaged by this legislation.” 
The favouritism shown towards owners “will be at the expense of 
obtaining information and knowledge.” Additionally, while his party did 
not object to the statutory licence, it should apply only when the user 
copied more than a reasonable portion, or 10 per cent or one chapter 
of a book. Bowen decried the time-consuming and extensive  
procedural requirements adopted in the bill, such as the certification 
procedures for copying a part of a book not readily available in, or 
through, bookstores. 
Bowen’s position did not repudiate outright Labor’s favoured doctrine 
of the little people, the authors and artists who depended on 
government favours for economic survival. But it suggested a radical 
forward step by his party in favour of users, hitherto seen by the Labor 
Party as only too willing to deprive the little people of their due reward 
by activities such as photocopying. 
By contrast, Barry Jones, the MP for Lalor, expressed views firmly in 
favour of the little people. Perhaps with slight irony, he congratulated 
the Attorney General’s Department for “record despatch in dealing 
with a report of this magnitude”. Like Rex Connor 12 years previously, 
he quoted Marshall McLuhan who declared that the Xerox machine 
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made every man his own publisher. By making mass reproduction 
possible, photocopying menaced the little people. If authors were not 
protected, foreign authors would receive no return, and no publisher 
would import their works. Authors needed “the financial incentives 
which induce people to write”. 
The tension between the views expressed by Bowen and Jones,  
which probably neither recognised, soon enough resolved in favour  
of the little people. The idea that every use of copyright material  
is remunerable, including, according to some, the act of reading  
a work, reasserted itself as a dogmatic truth in Labor’s cupboard  
of dogma.  
Jones seemed oblivious to the fact that without photocopying royalties 
publishers and authors received returns from the sale of works. He did 
not bother to ask whether photocopying undermined the sale of works. 
Bowen stood up for the user but thereafter, the Labor Government, in 
office for 13 years from 1983, left users to wander in the wilderness 
created by government. 
The copyright amendment bill eventually became law in 1981.1 Though 
considered to favour the educational establishments, it began the long 
ascendancy of the publishers over educational institutions in Australia. 
In his speech to Parliament in the 1980 copyright debate, Bowen 
quoted a telegram sent by the Law Institute of Victoria. The Institute 
asked for postponement of the copyright legislation. The telegram 
referred to the conclusions of the copyright reform committee led by 
Justice Whitford in the United Kingdom.  
Those conclusions, according to the Institute, differed from those of 
the Franki Committee. The Whitford Committee favoured 
“strengthening the claims of a copyright owner rather than weakening.” 
The Committee also seemed to support the licensing, collection and 
distribution arrangements proposed by the ACC. 
Outcome of legislation 
In time, the ACC, through its own efforts and the agency of CAL, 
achieved all that it set out to secure at the start of the Franki inquiry. It 
perhaps achieved more than it sought. It did so by concerted effort and 
persuasiveness, and because governments, leaning always towards the 
                                                     
1 Date of assent 19 September 1980, date of commencement sections 17–19 on 29 
September 1980; remainder on 1 August 1981. 
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claims of property, favoured the interests of copyright owners and the 
little people. In achieving its aims, the ACC overthrew two key 
presumptions articulated by Viner in his second reading speech 
introducing the copyright bill.  
The first is that most photocopying in educational institutions falls 
within the legislative definition of fair dealing or copying exception. 
The second is that the authors of works should be free to opt-out of 
any collecting scheme administered by a collecting agency such as CAL. 
The first presumption has not been definitively proved false because 
CAL does not permit effective external auditing of collected data.  
The Franki Report, and the 1981 copyright amendments were seen to 
reinforce the “balance” of interests between copyright owners and 
users. Unlike later reports and amendments, they can be read to 
perhaps favour, certainly to strongly identify, the interests of users. 
Both placed the onus for identifying infringement and then proposing 
licensing rates on the copyright owner, or, specifically, CAL. However, 
though the principle of statutory licensing remains entrenched in 
Australian law, the ends contemplated in the Franki Report and the 
implementing legislation were not realised. 
Neither intended the creation of a copyright ascendancy. The strategy 
of the ACC in the 1970s and 1980s closely resembled that pursued by 
APRA in the 1930s. APRA vehemently resisted the creation of a 
copyright tribunal to determine licensing disputes. Possessing a nearly 
complete repertoire of known copyright musical works, and 
unconstrained by any legislative checks, it wished to be left alone to use 
its overwhelming bargaining power to force radio stations and others to 
accept its terms. Later, realising that a tribunal offered a more efficient 
means of achieving a roughly similar result, it endorsed the creation of 
the Australian Copyright Tribunal. 
Similarly, the ACC saw that once legislation permitted a representative 
of owners to collect photocopying royalties on their behalf,  
owners would be placed in a position of negotiating strength. They had 
no need, in principle, to let a third party, such as the Copyright 
Tribunal, mediate between them and users. A direct bargain  
promised larger returns. Like APRA, the ACC came to see that the 
Tribunal could efficiently facilitate copying agreements that delivered 
attractive financial returns. Its activities, and those of CAL, reflect  
the intent to create, by degree, optimal conditions for determining and 
collecting fees. 
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Over a number of years, CAL persuaded government to legislate to 
revoke primary elements of the statutory scheme envisaged by the 
Franki Committee. A sampling system for estimating copying replaced 
the record-keeping system introduced in the 1981 legislation.  
Rates were determined by the Copyright Tribunal on a per page per 
copy basis. CAL became the exclusive Australian collecting 
representative of the entire collective of authors and publishers. The 
delicate balance sought by the Franki Committee – feasible or not – 
vanished into the air. 
The rise of CAL  
The early days 
In hindsight, CAL’s success seems inevitable. Its great rise from the 
days spent scratching in the dust for crumbs occurred over 25 years as 
if predestined. In reality, CAL fought hard, reliant on human effort and 
wiles, to secure its position of power and dominance, and sometimes 
without confidence of winning the battle.  
In this respect, it did not resemble APRA, which began operations in 
1926 backed by the resources of the British Performing Rights Society. 
By then, the PRS could look back on 12 years of existence in which it 
swept away domestic opposition to its claims. APRA could rely on the 
finances and advice of its British parent and could rely also on a 
priceless legal asset – the performing right. 
CAL could not in the beginning claim, like APRA, to represent the vast 
majority of copyright holders in its field. It was yet to secure the 
authority to act exclusively on behalf of most copyright owners. Its 
officers were neophytes in the enterprise of collecting copyright fees. 
APRA, though in 1926 newly incorporated, could rely on the expertise 
and experience of British executives who, for over a decade, established 
the PRS’s business. 
The advantages CAL could claim in 1981 were the determined backing 
of the ACC and its constituents, the author, publisher and journalist 
associations, and the existence of a new legal requirement for 
educational organisations to pay for photocopying. But the task ahead 
seemed daunting.  
The Copyright Act placed the onus on copyright owners to obtain 
records of copying from educational bodies and create legally 
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sustainable payment claims from data that was likely to be piecemeal or 
defective in other ways. The educational sector, especially the 
universities, showed little inclination in the past to cooperate with 
authors, publishers or their representatives. The job of determining 
liabilities and then securing payment seemed complex and difficult. 
Trying to give effect to the statutory licensing scheme, CAL confronted 
the educational institutions as an impecunious newcomer. From the 
beginning, however, it received moral support from some quarters of 
government. An explanatory document from 1974 recorded CAL’s 
gratitude for the “encouragement’ received from Senator Doug 
McClelland, the Minister for Media, and his department. The Council 
for the Arts, a government agency which helped to finance the ACC, 
enthusiastically endorsed the creation of the new collecting society.  
The founding of CAL realised, in one aspect, the Labor Government’s 
little people policy in favour of the arts generally, and writers 
specifically. The later criticism of the organisation as a vehicle serving 
primarily the interests of publishers lends depth to the separate 
criticism that Labor’s arts policy – foreshadowed in the speeches of 
Rex Connor and Gil Duthie in the 1968 parliamentary debate on 
copyright – falsely assumed that the creative interest could be advanced 
without reference to commercial imperatives. In the case of CAL, the 
commercial imperatives of publishers in due course swept aside the 
aspirations of many authors, and Gus O’Donnell himself.  
Registered as a company in 1974, CAL presented its first submission 
Reproduction in Schools to the Australian Education Council in Hobart in 
February 1974. The submission proposed a voluntary licensing scheme 
for government schools’ copying in all States. A second submission, 
Reproduction in Universities, followed. In the early years, CAL’s board 
advocated voluntary licensing. Chaired by O’Donnell, the Board, which 
also consisted of representatives of the associations of architects, 
publishers,2 musicians and photographers, insisted on the author’s right 
to refuse permission to copy. 
After the 1981 amendments to the Act, CAL adapted itself to the 
unwelcome reality of statutory licensing. Its board, and the ACC, saw 
presciently that the most effective way to achieve practical regulation of 
photocopying lay in tribunal arbitration. Accordingly, in 1983 CAL 
                                                     
2 George Ferguson, Director of the Australian Book Publishers Association, a 
member of the Spicer Committee and a strong advocate before the Franki 
Committee of the publishers’ interests, represented Australian publishers. 
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launched the first of many proceedings in the Copyright Tribunal that, 
together with facilitating legislative amendments, helped the 
organisation achieve its astonishing success as a collecting society. 
Civil war 
In the two years between the amendments and CAL’s first case in the 
Tribunal, internal revolution transformed the agency. Frankly described 
in the official history of CAL’s first 30 years,3 civil war broke out 
between O’Donnell and members of the CAL board representing 
publishers. Partisans for O’Donnell might have said that the conduct of 
his opponents was reminiscent of that which raised the ire of Australian 
senators during the 1905 and 1912 copyright debates.  
Alternatively, the ousting of O’Donnell from CAL’s board, and the 
rejection of his belief that CAL must above all serve the interests of 
authors, not publishers, can be seen as victories for economic realism. 
The publishers paid the bills, produced the books and distributed the 
book royalties. They had no intention of letting the ideology of authors’ 
rights upset the business of collecting photocopying fees.  
CAL’s civil war confounded Labor’s doctrine of little people, a doctrine 
which played no small part, philosophically, in the founding of the 
agency. The corporate transformation of CAL attests to the power of 
industries in determining how the rights of copyright owners are 
deployed and exercised. It also exposes a strain of venality in the 
authors’ rights doctrine.  
O’Donnell’s insistence on preference for authors subtracted from 
consideration the role of publishers in making authors’ works saleable. 
It also, by mental alchemy, transformed the legal right to remuneration 
to a moral right that brooked no limitation in any way disagreeable to 
authors or their representatives. O’Donnell’s approach became 
untenable. However much authors or governments demand preferment 
for artists, industries control rights and, pursuing profits, they 
sometimes subvert policies intended to deliver income or other benefits 
to creators. Publishers were hardly less mercenary than authors but they 
controlled the supply of money.  
The warfare between O’Donnell and the publishers erupted in 1981. 
The four publishers who sat on the CAL board as members of the 
                                                     
3 Peter Meredith, Realising the Vision: a History of the Copyright Agency Limited 1974–
2004 available at www.copyright.com.au/history_of_cal.htm. 
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Australian Book Publishers’ Association became increasingly hostile to 
O’Donnell’s insistence that CAL must distribute photocopying fees 
direct to authors. They demanded that publishers, who produced  
and distributed the authors’ works, and were practised in distributing 
book royalties, should receive income collected and then make 
allocations to authors. 
By 1982, CAL’s funding from miscellaneous sources evaporated, and 
the ABPA showed its hand. The Association refused to supply 
emergency funding and established its own collecting agency. The 
Australian Society of Authors, which until now supported O’Donnell, 
recognised that CAL could not continue without publisher support 
and, within months, caved in. Its management committee forced 
O’Donnell to resign from CAL and in 1983 APBA directors returned 
to CAL’s board.  
The APBA and ASA agreed to joint funding of CAL but the balance of 
power now lay unequivocally with the publishers, victors on the 
battlefield and keepers of the purse. Shocked and confused, O’Donnell 
and his supporters retreated. Seemingly, the work of an era lay in 
tatters. The publishers and their allies swept aside the past leader of the 
ASA and ACC, the man most responsible for the creation of CAL. 
They proved, again, the truth of George Bernard’s Shaw’s statement in 
1911 that in a contest between artists and industrialists, the artists 
“must go to the wall”.4  
Now began the ascent of CAL. Its board members saw that 
proceedings in the Copyright Tribunal promised the most efficient way 
of achieving their objectives and they resolved to apply to the Tribunal 
for the determination of rates for educational copying.  
Tribunal proceedings 
CAL’s 1983 application to the Tribunal to determine a per page rate for 
photocopying resulted in lengthy proceedings that only ended in March 
                                                     
4 Shaw protested to The Times about the proposed compulsory licence for 
recordings in the British Copyright Bill. He said: “An injustice has to be done either 
to us artists or the manufacturers. We, being artists, are poor and politically 
insignificant. They, being industrialists, are rich and can bully Governments. I 
suppose we must go to the wall but I do not see why we should do so without 
politely informing the public and the Government that we thoroughly understand 
what is happening to us …” 
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1985. In Copyright Agency Ltd v Department of Education of NSW,5 Justice 
Sheppard, settling on a rough median between the rates proposed by 
the parties, ruled that the State educational departments and various 
tertiary institutions were liable to pay a rate of 2 cents per page of 
copyright works copied.  
In doing so he fulfilled the prediction of the Sydney Morning Herald 
journalist Michele Field, who in 1983 wrote, “the tribunal will decide on 
something between 2 cents and 3 cents a page – too low to make 
authors and publishers happy, too high to be easily absorbed by school 
budgets.” She went on to say that nobody would “be satisfied and that 
perhaps is a definition of fairness in determining compensation.” 
Field also predicted with flawless accuracy the process of reasoning 
adopted by Sheppard. As she said, the Tribunal “will probably be 
guided in its determination of a fair price by looking at the costs of 
previous permissions … Then it must say that these value levels are to 
be discounted for a number of reasons.” Her most salient point 
followed: the Tribunal “will have to go through a set of motions and by 
something that looks like a process of deduction arrive at a pretty 
arbitrary figure.” 
Justice Sheppard determined the per page rate almost exactly as Field 
predicted. As she anticipated, he arrived at the figure of 2 cents by “a 
set of motions” that camouflaged an arbitrary method of reasoning.  
He also established the base rate for future adjustments by the  
Tribunal and the standard for future calculations of the value of 
copyright material. 
His approach is readily justified. Sheppard adopted the classic arbitral 
method of determining the value of goods or services. First he looked 
for evidence of previous bargains between the parties or bargains 
between other parties that established comparable industry norms. 
Then he took into account factors that might affect the bargain.  
In the 1930s, Justice Owen and Attorney General Latham expected  
that an arbitrator would use similar methods to determine the 
performance fees payable to APRA by radio stations. The arbitrator 
who determined the ABC’s liability to APRA in 1939 employed this 
conventional approach to valuation. 
Sheppard, though, seemed not to appreciate the novel aspects of the 
proceedings before him. The parties had not tried to negotiate a price. 
                                                     
5 [1985] ACopyT1. 
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Nor did the prospective payer derive a commercial benefit from the 
remunerable activity. Properly construed, Sheppard’s task involved pure 
valuation and called more for abstraction than consideration of 
hypothetical bargains determined by reference to the economic needs 
of the parties. 
Valuation  
What intrinsic value could be attributed to the page of a work 
considered discretely? The question seemed unanswerable. A more 
meaningful approach asked what value could be attributed to the 
exercise of the right to photocopy works. Framed in this way, the 
inquiry yields the answer that the attributable value of copying 
individual pages is negligible. The direct financial benefit to users of 
non-commercial copying is nil while the direct financial losses caused 
by photocopying seemed also, in most cases, to be nugatory.  
Sheppard did not canvass such abstractions. Had he done so, he might 
have settled on a rate much closer to the 2 cents proposed by the 
educational sector. In the midst of Sheppard’s “motions” the glaring 
truth went unnoticed: if copying did not deliver pecuniary profit to the 
copier or financial detriment to the owner, the presumption must be 
that the monetary value of copies made, or the thing copied, being 
indeterminate, must be low rather than high. In logical terms, the idea 
of fixing a per page rate for copies that applied uniformly to different 
works and different categories of work could not be justified. 
Justice Sheppard recognised the illogic inherent in the exercise he 
performed, but he pressed ahead, as he had to. The unfortunate 
consequence of his findings, which were perhaps inevitable – given the 
common understanding that he must create a notional bargain – is that 
ever since his decision, the copyright community has embraced a 
falsehood about the value of copying. This is that copies possess value 
in themselves and though the value cannot be precisely determined, the 
parties disputing value are merely bargaining over the price of goods 
and services. 
However they are not. The bargain is over the value of a page copied. 
Self-evidently, a copier attaches utility value to a page copied but the 
value is not, by any measure, accurately quantifiable. More importantly, 
the most meaningful measures – pecuniary benefit to copier and 
detriment to owner – indicate that the value attributed to a copied page 
should be negligible. The proposition that copying is of itself 
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remunerable, that every copy of a page must be remunerated, departs 
from the idea that copyright subsists in the entire work. It leads straight 
to the Gomorrah of copyright functioning solely as a device to raise 
revenue for owners. 
Be this as it may, Justice Sheppard’s decision in 1985 marked the 
beginning of CAL’s climb up copyright’s emerald mountain to the 
heights of prosperity and influence. Its receipts for educational copying 
in the first year after the decision amounted to a little over $14,000. 
Two decades later it recorded total annual revenue in excess of $100 
million. Annual licensing income grew progressively over the years, 
aided by favourable decisions of the Copyright Tribunal setting  
rates. CAL’s future revenue prospects may be gauged from the fact that 
60 per cent of total revenue growth occurred in a four year period  
after 2001. 
Success of CAL 
CAL’s achievement is remarkable. Facing a hostile or indifferent 
academic establishment, its officers undertook the tortuous work of 
examining the photocopying records of universities and schools, 
meeting with officials to complain about non-compliance with statutory 
record-keeping requirements, despatching invoices and waiting for 
results. In the early period, the agency employed one full time 
collections officer and a pair of administrative assistants. 
Yet little by little their persistence paid dividends. The organisation 
pushed for administrative reforms to achieve the ACC’s vision of 
mixed voluntary and statutory licensing, with copying quantities 
determined by sampling surveys, not the arduous process of record-
keeping. Underlying all these efforts, the per page copying rate, 
reviewable at intervals by the Copyright Tribunal, constituted the 
bedrock which enabled CAL to quantify copying and verify invoices. 
A breakthrough came in 1989. The Labor Government passed 
legislation amending the Copyright Act to permit voluntary licensing 
and institute sampling as the approved method for determining the 
quantum of copying. Licensed to act on behalf of more and more 
Australian authors and benefiting from reciprocal arrangements with 
sister organisations throughout the world, CAL also found itself in a 
position to collect for a growing army of authors and publishers.  
The agency cemented its position by persuading the Government to 
amend the Act to provide that only one collecting society could 
 
370 
administer either the educational or government statutory licences for 
copying. On application, CAL was declared the sole collecting society 
for educational and government copying. Parallel with the statutory 
licences, CAL embarked on an ambitious scheme to issue voluntary 
licences for commercial photocopying but by far the greatest part of its 
income poured in from the educational sector. 
Like APRA decades earlier, CAL pursued a pragmatic strategy of 
optimising returns by shooting sitting ducks. In the 1930s, APRA 
concentrated on negotiating licences with the ABC, which, as a 
government corporation, considered itself bound to honour the 
statutory obligation to pay performance fees. In the 1990s and beyond, 
the educational and government sectors similarly accepted statutory 
obligations that most commercial entities ignored. 
CAL only paid serious attention to copying by Commonwealth, State 
and Territory governments from about 2002 onwards. In the preceding 
15 years, it concentrated the greatest part of its efforts on educational 
establishments, and in 1999 obtained a ruling from Justice Burchett in 
the Copyright Tribunal which increased the per page copying rate to 4 
cents.6 Revenue from educational institutions totalled about 90 per cent 
of total CAL income. 
Digital and government copying  
From the mid 1990s CAL also consistently lobbied the federal 
Government to implement, on favourable terms, the relevant terms of 
the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty. The WIPO Copyright Treaty obliges 
contracting parties, including Australia, to give effect to obligations 
concerning the distribution, rental and communication of copyright 
material and the enforcement of these rights. Australia implemented 
the Treaty by passing the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000, 
which created the new exclusive right of communication to the public. 
The new communication right allowed copyright owners to control the 
transmission of digitised copyright material over the internet. The 
creation of the right accomplished for authors and publishers the 
objective sought by CAL for a decade: control over digital transactions 
involving copyright material. Owners gained the right to profit in 
cyberspace and CAL a new mission that guaranteed its future influence. 
                                                     
6 Justice Burchett set the per page rate for coursepacks at 5 cents, for page copies 
of artistic works and print music at 15 cents and for an artwork copied onto a slide 
at $1 per slide. 
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The benefits for owners were not absolute. To CAL’s dismay, the 
Government extended copying exceptions applicable to print copying 
to the copying of digital material. From the commencement of the 
Government’s amending legislation in 2001, CAL argued repeatedly in 
public for restrictions on fair dealings in the digital environment, 
limitations on the decryption of software intended to prevent 
unauthorised access to copyright material, and extension of the 
posthumous term. 
Simultaneously, the agency advocated a new method for educational 
institutions and others, to secure access to digital copyright material. 
Under the scheme proposed, users could browse a virtual library of 
registered works and, for a fee, download selected works from the CAL 
website. All the while, as CAL participated in public debate and 
examined new ways of collecting online copying fees, its revenues grew.  
Government represented a second source of secure revenue to CAL. 
Once apprised of the existence of the statutory licence – and CAL’s 
status as the declared collecting society for authors and publishers  
– government departments across the country did not cavil at the 
obligation to pay for copying. A photocopying agreement signed in 
1994 expired at the beginning of the new century and CAL began 
desultory negotiations for new contracts. By 2004, CAL’s demands had 
increased. It wanted government – and the educational sector – to pay 
fees for all digital copying and communication of works.  
The collecting society also demanded that government pay for copying 
survey maps and plans, hitherto assumed to have been created “by or 
under the direction or control” of government – and, therefore, owned 
by government under section 176 of the Copyright Act. To secure 
remuneration for plan copying, CAL pursued the strategy that had won 
it success after success since 1985 – litigation in the Copyright Tribunal.  
A setback  
In 2003, CAL asked the Tribunal to determine “equitable 
remuneration” (that is, fix fees) for the copying by NSW government 
of survey maps and plans. According to CAL, surveyors owned 
copyright in the registered plans, hitherto assumed to have been created 
“by or under the direction or control” of government, and, therefore, 
owned by government under section 176 of the Copyright Act.  
The State of New South Wales, adopting propositions suggested by a 
Queensland academic, Dr Anne Fitzgerald, argued that detailed 
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instructions issued by government specifying how survey plans were to 
be prepared, manifested governmental direction or control. In the 
alternative, the State argued that a royalty-free licence to copy maps and 
plans could be implied from the language of statutes and regulations 
governing plan registration. The systematic integration of plans in the 
government’s digital cadastral database – to help regulate State-wide 
property annexation, acquisition and disposal – demonstrated the non-
commercial public utility of the plans. 
In 2006, the Tribunal referred findings of fact to the Full Federal Court 
for determination of 11 questions of law. The Full Court, consisting of 
Justices Emmett, Lindgren and Finkelstein, each a judge of the 
Tribunal, heard arguments in March 2007 and delivered its judgment 
three months later. In Copyright Agency Limited v State of New South Wales,7 
their Honours ruled that copyright in maps and plans vested in the 
surveyors who created them but they also found that the statutory and 
regulatory framework for registration licensed the State to copy the 
maps and plans without remunerating surveyors. 
In judging the meaning of the phrase “direction or control”, Justices 
Emmett and Lindgren concentrated on the element of compulsion 
implied in the nouns. The State, they pointed out, could not compel 
surveyors to draw plans, it could only specify the way in which 
registrable plans must be prepared. Justice Finkelstein similarly found 
that “direction” referred to the “power” of the Crown to “require” the 
creation of a work and “control” to the “dominion” of the Crown over 
the “execution” of the work. Plans were made in fulfilment of private 
contracts and not under the State’s direction or control. For this 
reason, plan copyright vested in the surveyor (or the surveyor’s 
assignee, a point not discussed in the judgment). 
The Full Court declared that the legal scheme for registration licensed 
the State “to do everything that … the State is obliged or authorised to 
do with or in relation to registered plans.” The registration scheme 
existed for one reason: to create or affect legal rights in relation to land. 
Survey plans were created to enable the State to compile and maintain 
its cadastre and thus regulate real property transactions. The judgment 
of Justice Emmett, joined by Justice Lindgren, did not elaborate on the 
State purposes that necessitated an implied licence. Instead, the 
judgment seemed to treat as self-evident the inference that the terms of 
                                                     
7 [2007] FCAFC 80. 
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the statutory and regulatory scheme for registration manifested 
Parliament’s intent to create an implied licence. Their Honours said: 
The whole purpose and object of the preparation and lodgement with LPI of the 
Relevant Plans was to obtain registration of them so as to become registered plans, 
with the intention of creating or affecting legal rights in, or with respect to, the land 
to which they relate, or to create or affect the capacity to create or affect legal rights in 
respect of that land. The purpose was that lots in the Relevant Plans, whether a plan 
of subdivision or a strata plan, would become separate and discrete parcels in the 
register of landholdings of the State. These lots or parcels would themselves become 
part of the cadastre of the State, by the infrastructure and mechanisms provided for 
under the Real Property Act, the Conveyancing Act, the Strata Freehold Act, the 
Strata Leasehold Act and the Community Land Act. The surveyors who prepared 
each of the Relevant Plans must be taken to have authorised the State to do, in 
relation to the Relevant Plans, everything that the State is obliged to do in 
consequence of their registration, quite apart from the coincidental effect of s 183(1). 
In summary, the Federal Court construed section 176 of the Copyright 
Act narrowly and recognised authorial copyright in survey plans. To 
this extent, CAL’s arguments succeeded before the Court. But on the 
fundamental question of remuneration, CAL failed, and the Court’s 
implication of an unrestricted government licence to use survey plans 
for public purposes (as set out in the statutory registration scheme) may 
mean that Copyright Agency Limited v State of New South Wales comes to be 
regarded as a seminal case in the development of Australian copyright 
law.8 If the High Court hears an appeal against the Full Court’s 
decision, its judgment may confirm the putative principle that use of 
copyright material is remunerable, or perhaps point alternatively to a 
new principle that use does not confer an automatic right to 
remuneration.  
Revenue gains  
Despite this setback in the Federal Court, CAL’s revenue prospects 
surely gladdened the hearts of its board members. The problems of 
recording and reporting digital copying, and the communication of 
copies, as well as valuing these transactions, perplexed owners and 
users alike. But in the print domain, CAL continued to register rapid 
rises in annual revenue, thanks to increases to per page copying rates 
for educational institutions. In 1996 it recorded annual revenue of over 
                                                     
8 See also Chapter 4 ‘Copyright’ in B. Fitzgerald, A. Fitzgerald, T. Beale, G. 
Middleton, and YF Lim, Internet and E-Commerce Law and Policy, Thomson, 2007. 
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$18 million. Within five years, annual income more than doubled. In 
the following five years, income rose by nearly 60 per cent to over $100 
million, while expenditure remained below 15 per cent of revenue. 
In the financial year ending 2006, educational institutions contributed 
$77.5 million to CAL’s coffers and the government sector $6.8 million. 
The agency could declare decades of remarkable achievement, and did 
so in 2004, publishing a celebratory history of its first 30 years. The real 
work of collection and distribution took place in the years after 1986, 
and only after 1996, when income poured out of universities and 
schools, did CAL truly entrench itself in public consciousness as a 
collecting society equivalent in status and influence to APRA. 
The copyright gospel 
In the two decades from 1986, one figure seemed to personify the 
agency and its philosophy. Michael Fraser joined CAL in 1985 and 
carried out the protracted and difficult task of inspecting records of 
copying at schools and tertiary institutions, collating data and preparing 
invoices. He wrote the agency’s first business plan, and his ideas about 
how CAL should develop shaped the organisation’s future. Although 
not bellicose like Gus O’Donnell, he shared the latter’s partisanship for 
copyright owners. 
As CAL’s chief executive for 20 years, he became O’Donnell’s spiritual 
heir, ardently performing the duty identified long before by CAL’s first 
chairman as a sacred necessity – collecting taxes for photocopying. 
Unlike O’Donnell, however, he did not prefer the interests of authors 
over those of publishers, and concentrated on the accretion of revenue, 
a pragmatic strategy favoured by publishing houses.  
Fraser is perhaps the most remarkable figure to appear in contemporary 
Australian copyright politics. An ambling, softly spoken, seemingly 
unworldly figure, he impressed his views on government committees 
and officials with consistent, persuasive force, becoming identified, like 
no other person, with the cause of copyright owners. Fraser guided 
CAL to extraordinary income growth but his chief contribution did not 
lie in business planning. He is likely to be remembered, above all, as a 
singularly effective proselytiser for the cause of copyright protection. 
In spreading the good news of the copyright gospel he won over 
Parliamentary and government inquiry committees and numerous 
politicians and government officials. Only the hint of unctuousness 
blemished the perfection of his formal manner. The other advocates of 
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copyright, usually less tranquil in their presentation, were not so 
successful in drawing immediately favourable responses from 
interrogators. Politicians reflexively accept the theorem that property 
rights may expand but do not contract, and to varying degrees, are 
inclined to favour the arguments of copyright advocates. Even so, 
Fraser’s gift for something like hypnotic persuasion advanced  
the interests of copyright owners generally in a way that cannot  
be overestimated. 
Possibly, his mesmeric intensity in discourse, combined with his 
seeming detachment from proceedings, derived from his reputed 
attachment to Buddhist practice. In public hearings, his calm presence 
among fraught gatherings of politicians and lobbyists suggested a 
Tibetan Buddhist tableau, in which the enlightened figure floats far 
above the angry demons who contend in the infernal realms below.  
He was not free from delusion. He wholeheartedly embraced the 
simple message proclaimed by Gus O’Donnell and the copyright 
movement at large, that a work, in any manifestation, is property, the 
use of which demands remuneration. Advocates of this view have 
marched in step for a century to make the idea that every use is 
remunerable a legal reality. Taken to its logical conclusion, the theory 
demands that the act of reading a work be taxed. Yet even if theory is 
realised in law, it may still be contradicted by logic, commonsense or 
natural justice. 
Under Michael Fraser, CAL achieved staggering success in revenue 
collection, and came to represent a maximalist view of copyright in 
public debate. In this respect, the agency embodied the American 
zeitgeist that demanded more control, and more and more revenue to 
feed the copyright machine. But neither Fraser, nor his allies, have ever 
satisfactorily explained their demands for more and greater entitlements 
for copyright owners.  
They reversed Proudhon’s 19th century aphorism that property is theft. 
In their eyes, the thieves were those who declared the right to use 
property without payment. Whether or not something should be 
declared property, or whether a user should pay for use were questions 
they would not debate. If the law declared subject matter property then 
the legislative rationale, or the politics leading to legislation, or any 
philosophical consideration, were irrelevant.  
Quod scripsi scripsi: the law justified itself. On this basis the great 
copyright caravan headed into the West to create a new world, and at 
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the wild frontiers of this world, outlaws were hunted down. But one 
truth remained: the proponents of copyright never showed by what 
right, or reason, other than legislative fiat, they could turn users into 
renegades and drive them from the scene. 
Fraser departed CAL in May 2007, his work faintly praised by the 
agency’s chairman Brian Johns. Johns thanked Fraser for his “long and 
successful service to CAL” and added that “we wish him well in his 
future endeavours.” Like his predecessor Gus O’Donnell, he departed 
seemingly unwept, unhonoured and unsung. Fraser’s persuasive gifts 
perhaps no longer suited the requirements of a major company 
intending to efficiently secure revenue from sources outside the 
educational and government sectors. But his long tenure worked greatly 
to CAL’s advantage, his zeal helping to secure many advantages 
decreed by government and tribunal. 
A reversal for CAL and possible consequences  
A few weeks after Fraser’s resignation, the unanimous decision of the 
Full Federal Court in Copyright Agency Limited v State of New South Wales 
dismayed CAL’s executive. While the agency swiftly applied for leave to 
appeal the decision, the case threatened to disturb CAL’s confident 
march into the rose-coloured dawn of a new era. The Full Court’s 
findings undermined the assumption that copyright unfailingly 
conferred a right of remuneration. Its judgment struck at a cherished 
article of the copyright faith. Since 1968, copyright proponents and 
policymakers in Australia took for granted the copyright owner’s 
automatic entitlement to economic reward.  
The Franki Report accepted unquestioningly the owner’s right to exact 
fees for per page copying in educational institutions and the statutory 
licence for educational copying implicitly assumed that the law 
demanded remuneration for page photocopying. Cases in the Copyright 
Tribunal fixed equitable remuneration for page copying and neither 
parties nor judges questioned the legal justification (outside the 
statutory licensing schemes) for collecting fees for the non-commercial 
copying of fractions of a work. CAL enjoyed success after success as 
the Tribunal determined fees, and increases to fees, for educational and 
government copying. 
Now, for the first time in its history, the agency tasted the bitter  
fruits of unequivocal legal defeat. For the first time, a court listened  
to arguments that attacked the premise that made possible  
 
377 
CAL’s ascendancy – the idea that all copying outside the statutory 
exceptions is remunerable. The Court found that NSW government 
could, by implied licence, copy and communicate registered survey 
plans without paying royalties to surveyors. CAL found itself denied the 
right to collect fees under a statutory licence. The 3-0 margin of 
decision and the award of costs against the agency underlined the 
extent of its setback. 
CAL applied to the High Court for special leave to appeal the Full 
Court’s judgment on the principal ground that the statutory licence for 
government copying, conferred by section 183 of the Copyright Act, 
precludes any other licence for government copying and 
communication. According to CAL’s application, the section 183 
licence created a comprehensive scheme for government copying that 
enjoined remuneration. The legislature intended the licence to govern 
total government use of copyright material. Considered in isolation or 
the context of an appeal to the High Court,9 the Full Court’s decision 
invites consideration of related questions ignored or dismissed over 
decades – whether the purpose of a copyright use ought to determine 
whether the use is remunerable, or be considered a primary factor in 
determining scales of remuneration.  
Consideration of purpose leads directly to examination of both 
legislative and administrative intent – what Parliament intended  
when passing copyright laws, and what policy the executive adopted 
when interpreting rights. Such an exercise is not precluded by the treaty 
obligation to limit exceptions to the exclusive rights and could lead to 
radical conclusions, including the proposition that that  
if copyright does not of itself confer a right to remuneration, the right 
is circumstantial.10  
                                                     
9 At the time of publication, the High Court had not heard CAL’s application for 
special leave to appeal, lodged on 30 July 2007. 
10 Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, adopted in Article 13 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, requires signatories to restrict limitations and exceptions to the 
exclusive rights to “certain special cases” which “do not conflict with the normal 
exploitation” of copyright works and “do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the rights holder.” The Canadian scholar Daniel Gervais argued that the 
“three step test” for determining whether an exception satisfied treaty requirements 
should be reversed so that more weight is given to consideration of questions of 
economic prejudice and exploitability. He proposed an “effects-based” test that 
focused on the effect of a use rather than the nature of the use. Private uses that do 
not directly harm the owner’s economic interests ought usually to be allowed for 
practical and public interest reasons. See Daniel J. Gervais, “Towards a New Core 
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In what circumstances might the right not apply? It is doubtful that 
legislators in Britain and Australia in 1911 and 1912 intended for 
copyright owners to claim remuneration for non-commercial uses of 
copyright material. Nor is it clear that their successors in 1956 and 1968 
in any way envisaged the compensation schemes effected by the 
statutory licences for educational and government copying. The Spicer 
Committee proposed that the Crown pay just compensation to 
copyright owners for the compulsory use of their copyright material, 
but neither the Committee nor any other official body considered 
criteria for determining compensation, and, by association, any grounds 
for denying compensation.  
Copyright Agency Limited v State of New South Wales has made possible 
meaningful debate over questions previously ignored. What is the 
commercial detriment to copyright owners of educational or 
government uses of copyright material? Should a non-commercial 
purpose, or a use that is not directed towards competition or advantage 
in a market, be subject to copyright fees? If the answer is yes, should 
the fees be discounted to allow for the purpose of use?  
These questions, if posed by the Copyright Tribunal, might lead to 
reduction of fees fixed for remuneration under statutory schemes. 
Posed by policymakers, they might conceivably result in initiatives to 
declare, for instance, government use of copyright material for 
categorically non-commercial public purposes exempt from fees or 
protected by restrictions on fees.  
The copyright collecting societies 
The question of distributions 
At the beginning of the new century, APRA and CAL constituted the 
vanguard of copyright collecting societies in Australia. By this stage, 
over 10 collecting societies operated in Australia and New Zealand, 
evidencing what could only be guessed at when APRA commenced 
operations in the 1920s: a significant function of contemporary 
                                                                                                           
International Copyright Norm: The Reverse Three Step Test”, Marquette Intellectual 
Property Law Review, Vol 9, Spring 2005. Gervais tied effect to purpose. “The author 
has a right in respect of any commercially significant use; use that would normally 
be the subject of a commercial transaction. Any situation not covered by this right 
would be one that is not subject to normal commercial exploitation and is justified 
by a valid public interest purpose.”  
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copyright legislation is to efficiently regulate the transfer of income 
from the army of copyright users to copyright owners, or, put another 
way, to facilitate the taxation of copyright use. 
In 2006, APRA and CAL each collected more than $100 million 
annually from their licensees. The other main societies lagged far 
behind in income returns but most collected multiple millions of dollars 
each year. The final destination of money collected remains largely 
unknown. Collecting societies jealously guard the details of 
distributions and outsiders, including major licensees such as 
government agencies, cannot ascertain to whom, and in what amount, 
licence fees are distributed. 
A fog has covered distributions since the 1920s. APRA’s articles of 
association contained a secrecy clause and nowadays CAL flatly refuses, 
on confidentiality grounds, to disclose distribution details. APRA’s first 
licensees, music hall owners, radio stations and so on, declared that 
they were willing to pay public performance fees to the authors of 
music, but did not want fees distributed to music publishers. APRA, 
however, resisted their requests for full disclosure of distributions. 
Secrecy breeds suspicion and critics continue to impugn the silence of 
collecting societies on distributions. The main suspicion has not altered 
since the 1920s. Collecting societies, say critics, are primarily conduits 
for the transfer of bulk receipts to music and literary publishers and a 
handful of recording, film and media corporations. Societies respond to 
criticisms by pointing to their constitutions and policies, which 
sometimes require that authors’ representatives occupy 50 per cent of 
board seats, or that authors receive the majority of income collected. 
Secrecy prompts a second, less commonly articulated, concern. If – in 
the case of APRA and CAL – the bulk of money collected finds its way 
in royalty payments to authors, do their royalties justify the massive 
income transfer from users to owners? If justice to authors is measured 
in monetary returns, does the collecting system deliver justice to 
authors? If, for the sake of argument, CAL distributes to Australian 
authors an average annual royalty payment of $100, does this return 
justify the cost of collection, including the cost of contract negotiation? 
One thing is certain. The refusal of collecting societies to disclose at 
least rudimentary statistics about distributions precludes meaningful 
debate about the merits of the collecting system. Another fact is 
undeniable. The copyright industries are intimately connected with the 
major collecting societies, and though it cannot be said definitely that 
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they represent the collecting arms of the industries, the societies and 
industries are entwined in relationships of mutual benefit. 
Sources of income 
In 2006, a number of important societies operated in parallel to APRA 
and CAL. They included Screenrights (the Audiovisual Copyright 
Society Ltd), the Australian Mechanical Copyright Owners’ Society Ltd 
(AMCOS), the Phonographic Performance Company of Australia Ltd 
(PPCA) and the Visual Arts Copyright Collecting Agency (Viscopy).  
Formed in 1990, Screenrights is declared under the Copyright Act as 
the collecting society for copying by educational institutions of material 
broadcast on TV and radio. AMCOS collects, on behalf of the music 
publishers and composers royalties for recordings of performances of 
musical works. Its origins can be traced to 1956 (though the company 
website states the date of incorporation as 1979). The PPCA, founded 
in 1969, collects, on behalf of record companies, fees for the public 
performance and broadcasting of sound recordings and music videos. 
Viscopy, established in 1995, collects royalties for the publication of 
visual art.  
The greater number of Australian collecting societies collect fees for 
the exercise of the mechanical and performing rights applying to 
musical works, sound recordings and films. Their licensees are usually, 
though not invariably, commercial users of copyright material. The 
great bulk of income collected by CAL and Screenrights, however, is 
derived from the non-commercial sector. Following in the path of 
APRA, which for years derived the largest portion of its revenue from 
the ABC, they secured from the educational and government sectors 
lucrative and certain sources of income. 
Further questions thus demand consideration. If justice for authors 
means the payment of royalties for copying, why has CAL neglected to 
sweep through the world of commerce to ensure that authors are 
remunerated for the millions of copies of works made by businesses 
each year? Why is Screenrights constituted to collect primarily from 
educational institutions? Why did governments legislate to ensure that 
the educational sector and government paid photocopying royalties 
while allowing business to thumb its nose at authors? 
One answer is that on the great plains annexed by the copyright 
pioneers and their successors, the educational and government bodies 
move thoughtlessly like herds of wildebeest, easy prey for predators 
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seeking sustenance. The commercial world, symbolised best by 
trampling elephants, represents a more fearsome challenge. If they dare 
to confront the trumpeting herd, the predators soon scatter, lest they 
be crushed.  
Copyright in software 
A new imperium 
In June 1984, Australia amended the Copyright Act to protect 
computer programs as literary works. In doing so, it followed the 
United States, which in 1976 recognised copyright in software, and 
preceded Britain, which recognised software copyright in 1985. Japan, 
the Federal Republic of Germany and France also passed software 
copyright legislation in 1985. More than any other event, the 
recognition of software copyright in countries such as Australia and 
Britain signified the coming dominance of the United States in world 
copyright affairs.  
The US copyright imperium, directed by the magnates of software, 
film, television, music, publishing and internet industries, first began to 
truly exercise its might in the 1980s. The importunities of industry 
leaders, intensely stated on Capitol Hill and in the Office of the  
United States Trade Representative, created an energy that radiated 
through the world’s copyright decision-making bodies and the  
world’s legislatures.  
The Australian software legislation in 1984 marked the starting point of 
US domination in Australian copyright law-making. Afterwards, 
Australia amended the Copyright Act in conformity with the prescripts 
of the US industries as these were mediated by Congress, the USTR 
and world copyright organisations. 
The 1984 amendments also established a template for the process of 
future revisions. As in 1984, government determines the shape of 
amendments by reference to one or all of the same constellation of 
interlinked factors: international copyright law or practice, trade 
prerogatives of the United States and the demands of industry. Then 
follows the preparation of draft legislation (or a plan of legislation), 
domestic consultation, and finally the passage of legislation that satisfies 
the needs of owners while recognising the exceptions and fair dealing 
principles in the Copyright Act.  
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From 1984, most significant modifications to Australian copyright law 
were determined by the wishes of the United States and domestic 
consultation only marginally altered the substance of amendments. The 
old imperium that dominated Australian copyright thinking, constituted 
in no particular order by the Berne Convention and Britain, vanished as 
a determining entity. The Berne Convention continued in force but 
new international forums and instruments, functioning to satisfy the 
export requirements of the US copyright industries, dictated the pattern 
of legislative revision. 
The United States recognises copyright in software 
The story of software copyright protection begins in the United States. 
In 1964, the US Copyright Office registered two computer programs, 
one recorded on paper, the other on magnetic tape. The Copyright 
Office determined that the sequences on punched cards, the storage 
medium for computer programs, expressed data that could be 
understood by a person. A computer program, whether expressed on 
paper or a tape, yielded functional meanings and, subject to the 
requirements of originality, intelligibility and publication, could be 
protected, according to the Office, as a literary work. 
For a decade after 1974, WIPO, at the instigation of the United 
Nations, examined possibilities for “sui generis”, or stand-alone, 
copyright protection that the UN hoped might facilitate Third World 
access to software. WIPO presented model provisions for international 
consideration, and proposed the option of owners depositing source 
code with a registration office. When copyright expired, the code would 
be released to the public. The international computer industry did not 
support the model provisions and the proposals lapsed. 
In 1976, the new US Copyright Act defined ‘literary works’ as works 
“expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or 
indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as books, 
periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in 
which they are embodied.” The House of Representatives Report 
explaining the Act said that the literary works included computer 
databases and programs “to the extent that they incorporate authorship 
in the programmer’s expression of original ideas”. 
The definition of literary works in the Act, however, did not clearly 
identify the scope of copyright protection of software. To cure this 
defect, amendments passed in 1980, introduced a definition of 
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computer programs and specified types of non-infringing copying or 
adaptation of programs. The amendments were only partly successful. 
Over the next 15 years and beyond, courts in the US, Britain and 
Australia were asked to interpret definitions of computer programs and 
the boundaries of legitimate copying. 
Doubts over object code 
In the United States, the courts soon confirmed that copyright 
protected source and object code and then turned to articulating 
methods to determine whether protection extended to the non-literal 
elements of a program. The scope of software protection increased 
steadily over the years. In Australia, the first significant litigation on 
software copyright turned on whether copyright protection extended to 
object code, which converts source code into machine-readable form. 
In Apple Computer Inc v Computer Edge Pty Ltd,11 the judge at first instance 
found that copyright protected only source code. The full court of the 
Federal Court swiftly reversed his finding, but, to eliminate doubt, the 
Government in 1984 amended the Copyright Act to establish that 
copyright vested in both forms of code.  
Despite the amendments, the defendant company appealed to 
Australia’s highest court. In 1986, in Computer Edge Pty Ltd v Apple 
Computer Inc, the High Court found that while source code – in this case 
evidenced by writing on paper – is a literary work within the meaning 
of the definition in the Copyright Act, object code is not.12 The 
majority decided that object code stored in the circuitry of computers 
sold by the appellant did not adapt or reproduce source code. 
In reaching its conclusions, the Court interpreted the copyright 
legislation in force at the time of the alleged infringements, not the 
legislation as amended in 1984. The judges focused on the question of 
infringement by reproduction, and determined that infringement 
required substantial literal reproduction – electrical impulses processing 
source code were not literal. The Court’s decision received a mixed 
reception and before long the weight of US jurisprudence and industry 
pressure demanded a shift in judicial attitude. A new consensus became 
clear in 1992, when three judges of the High Court emphasised that  
                                                     
11 (1983) 50 ALR 581. 
12 1CLR 171. The Court’s ruling confirmed the judgment of Justice Beaumont at 
first instance in the Federal Court (1983) and the minority reasoning of Justice 
Sheppard on the Full Bench of the Federal Court (1984).  
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the definition of computer program in the amended Act extended to 
object code.13  
In the early 1980s, the main computer producers were unvarying in 
their position on the copyright status of both object and source code. 
In Australia, US computer giants, such as Apple, never flagged in 
proclaiming the message that copyright subsists in object code. Their 
Australian subsidiaries informed the federal Government that without 
copyright in both types of code, the computer industry would perish, 
the victim of Taiwanese and other offshore pirates.  
The 1984 amendments reflected the Government’s wholehearted 
acceptance of the argument that continued investment demanded 
property rights. They also embodied the Government’s direct  
response to the Federal Court finding that copyright did not subsist in 
object code.  
The Apple case 
Proceedings in the Apple case, as the trio of court battles waged 
between the Apple corporation and Computer Edge became known, 
began in 1983. Apple sued Computer Edge, a Melbourne computer 
retailer in the Federal Court. Apple alleged infringement of copyright 
and trade practices legislation and sought damages and injunctions 
preventing the company from selling personal computers.  
The owner of Computer Edge, Michael Suss, fell out with Apple before 
1983, when the latter cancelled his licence to sell its computers. 
Contravening Apple’s instructions, Suss sold the computers with non-
proprietary disk drives because, he said, the American disk drives were 
too expensive. After losing his dealership, Suss turned to selling 
Taiwanese computers, badging them as Wombat computers.  
Apple mounted an uncomplicated case against Suss. According to the 
company, the Taiwanese manufacturers of Wombat computers copied 
on six machine microchips object code from the Apple programs 
Applesoft and Applestart. By importing and selling the allegedly 
infringing machines, Suss, and his company, said the statement of 
claim, broke the law. The object code in each chip constituted a literary 
work within the meaning given to that term in the Copyright Act, and 
reproductions of the code therefore infringed Apple’s copyright.  
                                                     
13 Chief Justice Mason and Justices Brennan and Deane in Autodesk Inc v Martin 
Dyason & Ors (1992) 173 CLR 330. 
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Bolstered by legislative trends in the United States, and a recent victory 
in a similar matter heard by the US Court of Appeals,14 Apple 
approached the case confidently. The validity of its arguments seemed, 
in the eyes of executives, self-evident. To general consternation, 
however, the company’s arguments found no favour with the trial 
judge. In December 1983, Justice Brian Beaumont declared object code 
etched onto the microchips to be purely functional, with no original 
expressive elements. The code did no more than control a sequence of 
operations in the computer. Minus the key element of originality, object 
code could not be called a literary work.  
Politicians, no less than industry executives, were stunned. The 
Attorney General, Gareth Evans, the Minister for Trade and Industry, 
John Button, and Barry Jones, the Minister for Science and Technology 
– all partisans for investment in local industry – swiftly huddled with 
representatives of companies and industry associations. After a 
fortnight, they announced that the Government would legislate to 
“ensure software is adequately protected”. In a press release, they 
indicated that legislation might amend the Copyright Act but stated a 
preference for protecting software under patents legislation.  
Appeal to the Full Court 
In the meantime, Apple launched an immediate appeal, throwing its full 
weight behind the court action, heard in February 1984. According to a 
contemporary report in the Sydney Morning Herald, the company “poured 
a lot of resources into the effort, which at times has assumed the 
dimensions of a Holy Crusade – against the infidel company and its 
boss.” Suss struck back by denouncing the Government for “pandering 
to the whim of the multinationals.” 
By the Herald’s reckoning, the Australian computer industry considered 
Suss a “traitor to the cause”, a purveyor of “rotten Apples”. Apple’s 
national marketing manager put Apple’s position simply. “We believe,” 
he said, “that property rights should be protected.” To run the appeal, 
Apple retained the services of Michael McHugh QC, then only five 
years away from appointment to the High Court bench.  
Not everyone agreed that software should be called property. Alfred 
Langer, the spokesman of Software Liberation, announced in the Herald 
in early 1984 that “copyright laws are an artificial restraint on trade, 
                                                     
14 Apple Computer Inc v Franklin Computer Corporation (1983) 714 F2d 1240. 
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intended to preserve monopolies over products that would otherwise 
have their prices pushed down by free competition.” Suss argued that 
software development depended on copying and adaptation. Apple’s 
leaders, he said, “encourage other people to write programs for the 
Apple and there are now many thousands of programs available.  
Why shouldn’t there be other machines available which can run  
those programs?”  
The appeal to the full bench of the Federal Court resulted in a swift 
reversal of Beaumont’s decision and the award of full costs against 
Suss.15 On the question of software infringement, the majority ruled 
that object code fell within the definition of the legislative definition of 
‘literary work’. Justice Fox said: 
There is no necessity for a literary work to be a work of any literary quality. It is 
accepted that the term includes mathematical tables, codes, and in general 
alphanumerical works. One limit, doubtless, is that it needs to be a work and to 
have had some skill, even if small, applied to its preparation. There is no doubt that 
a great deal of skill went into the preparation of what was written, and that what 
was written could be read and understood by suitably trained people. 
In his dissent, Justice Sheppard noted that translation of source code 
into object code, which involves the generation of electrical impulses, 
could not be seen by the human eye. Only the machine could 
understand or see the object code. In short, a human could not make 
sense of the code – a printout of object code displays digital notations 
on paper, which, taken together, cannot be literally understood. 
Invisible, and, in literal form inexplicable, object code in computer 
chips could not be classified as a literary work.  
Suss, cast by the press as David confronting Goliath, boldly pressed on, 
appealing the decision to the High Court. He found vindication two 
years later, but the High Court’s decision in his favour came too late. 
By then the Government had corralled the bolting horse and shut the 
stable door.16 
 
                                                     
15 Apple Computer Inc v Computer Edge Pty Ltd (1984) 53 ALR 225. 
16 The 1984 amendments attracted the criticism that they did not amend the section 
in the Act explaining the meaning of ‘reproduction’ to encompass the ways in 
which a computer digitally stores information. Some software proprietors 
considered that courts and legislation took a restrictive view of copying that opened 
doors to infringement. 
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The Government’s response 
The Government’s amending legislation changed the Act’s definition of 
‘literary work’ to include a ‘computer program’, defined as “an 
expression” of “instructions” to a computer in “any language, code or 
notation”.17 The bill also defined ‘adaptation’ of a computer program to 
clearly establish that the term applied to the translation of computer 
languages for purposes such as compiling or assembling programs. The 
bill made clear that the definition of ‘infringing copy’ applied to copies 
of adaptations of works. It also defined the term ‘material form’ to 
apply to non-visible forms of storage from which or work or 
adaptation could be reproduced, including in disks, integrated circuits 
and computer memory.  
From an historical perspective, the Government’s response to the first 
Apple decision is interesting not principally because of the content  
of its legislative amendments but the way in which they were prepared 
and implemented. The Attorney General Gareth Evans, abetted  
by his ministerial colleagues John Button and Barry Jones, who  
were responsible for the Government’s industrial and scientific policy, 
never wavered in the belief that Justice Beaumont’s decision threatened 
an industry. 
Each minister emphasised the need to protect the Australian software 
industry and each characterised software piracy as a potentially 
catastrophic threat to the industry’s survival. Arguments about the 
creative benefit of restricting proprietary software rights cut no ice. 
What mattered was that local programmers and suppliers, working  
for (or in concert with) US manufacturers, expressed alarm  
about the increasing penetration of the Australian market by  
Taiwanese manufacturers. 
Ironically, the legislative reforms seemed to stultify rather than 
encourage the development of a native Australian programming 
industry, and they consolidated the hold of US manufacturers  
on the domestic market. The most interesting fact about Evans’s 
approach to reform is that his analysis – and that of his department – 
                                                     
17 The complete definition referred also to conversion to another language and 
reproduction in another material form for the purpose of causing a computer to 
perform a particular function. The Government amended the Act in 2000 to 
substitute a simpler, definition which stated that ‘computer program’ means “a set 
of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order 
to bring about a certain result.” 
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relied heavily on the premise that investment by copyright proprietors 
(or putative proprietors) demands legal protection. The Spicer 
Committee introduced to Australian copyright thinking the simple 
proposition that investment deserves legal protection and Evans 
entrenched it as the unwavering theme of future policy makers. 
While the idea of government protecting legitimate investment from 
unfair competition is hardly controversial, Evans and his colleagues 
pre-judged the question of fair competition. They rejected Justice 
Beaumont’s decision not for reasons of principle but because they 
believed, with good reason, that Australia could not afford to ignore 
the wishes of the US computer industry. The needs of Apple and the 
larger US software community lay behind Evans’s rush to legislation, 
though he referred in communiqués to the need to secure the 
Australian industry’s future. 
Contemporary press reporting suggested divided opinions among 
Australian software programmers and suppliers in the six months 
between Beaumont’s decision and the Government’s amendments. 
Some programmers argued that copyright protection would 
concentrate proprietary rights in the hands of large manufacturers and 
stifle innovation. The suppliers of US software argued that  
without protection local software producers would lose incentive to 
create programs, while US companies would lose incentive to export  
to Australia. 
Debate and consultation 
They argued that Beaumont’s decision threatened the local packaged 
software market, which before his decision they expected to grow at a 
rate of 100 per cent per annum. The Australian Computer Services 
Association, chaired by Jodee Rich, later a controversial figure in the 
telecommunications industry, led the protests. Rich declared that in the 
six months after Beaumont’s judgment, Imagineering, his packaged 
software supply company, lost 30 per cent of sales to supplies of 
imported copied software.  
The Government responded unequivocally in favour of Apple and 
groups like ACSA represented by Rich. Its approach prefigured that of 
the United Kingdom Parliament, which a year later passed private 
member’s bill to amend the copyright legislation to recognise copyright 
in computer programs. The passage of the UK bill owed a great deal to 
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the campaigning of the British Federation Against Software Theft.18 In 
both Australia and Britain, Government listened to an uncomplicated 
message about investment and revenue, and blocked out voices 
spreading alternative arguments. 
It made a straightforward choice to accept a natural hegemony created 
by the explosive growth of the US software industry and its spread 
across the globe. Embracing the prerogatives of the US industry made 
sense commercially and politically. Once accepted, the argument that 
Australian industry depended on US investment precluded 
considerations of principle.  
Thus even if arguments that Taiwanese computer chips did not infringe 
copyright laws were sustainable in principle, necessity demanded that 
the law must change. Concerns about the possibility of copyright law 
facilitating price and distribution control by software companies were 
irrelevant. Even the radical suggestion that new laws would spell the 
end of a genuinely independent local industry, and enforce the total 
control of US manufacturers, made no impression on the Government. 
Evans explained the Government’s philosophy in his second reading 
speech for the amendments, delivered on 4 June 1984. When he 
announced the decision to legislate two weeks after Beaumont’s 
judgement: 
My department had already consulted with industry regarding international software 
developments on the legal status of computerised software, computerised data banks 
and computer-created works and some issues had been raised in the current review of 
audiovisual copyright laws. Officers had also participated in studies of these matters 
at the international level. 
He outlined to his listeners the process of consultation managed by the 
Attorney General’s Department prior to the drafting of legislation. In 
January, the department wrote to “industry and user” groups supplying 
a short options paper and inviting submissions on “the manner in 
which the Copyright Act might be amended”.  
The department received almost 100 responses and in March 1984 held 
a National Symposium on Legal Protection of Computer Software  
“to consider both domestic and international policies for Australia and 
                                                     
18 In 1984, FAST estimated the cost to the computer industry of piracy at £150 
million per annum. The Department of Trade and Industry reported that in the 
same period the annual turnover of the British software industry was about £1 
billion.  
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also to cover other computer-related copyright issues, such as the 
protection to be accorded to works stored in, or created with the aid  
of, computers.” 
In April, the Government invited WIPO to convene a working group 
to consider technical questions related to the legal protection of 
software. By the time amendments were drafted, Evans’s department 
had heard from a range of local and international technical and legal 
experts, as well as the representatives of libraries, universities, 
consumer groups, government agencies, the legal profession, patent 
attorneys, the press and the computer industry. 
How much a consensus emerged to shape the Government’s views, or 
the Government discerned a consensus that satisfied its objectives, can 
only be guessed. At any rate, its stated intention to legislate to 
overcome the effect of Justice Beaumont’s decision found realisation a 
mere six months after the decision, in June 1984. The consultative 
approach adopted by Evans’s department, and the reasons he gave for 
legislation, created the essential pattern for future copyright legislative 
amendments. 
The need for legislation 
According to Evans, consultation confirmed the vital need for 
legislation: 
From the consultations it was clear that the absence of legal protection and continued 
uncertainty as to the state of the law would jeopardise the local software industry and 
that it was urgently necessary for there to be some legal protection.  
The reason he gave for urgency was that free riders could easily 
duplicate software developed at great expense. One silent exclamation 
cements the arguments in Evans’s speech: “investment!” For the first 
time in Australian copyright history, a speech introducing copyright 
legislation concentrated fundamentally on economic utility as the 
rationale for protection.  
Evans gave complete expression to the utilitarian philosophy 
enunciated by the Spicer Committee, which believed that the fact of 
large-scale productive investment justified granting copyright 
protection. He outlined with due reverence the balance theory of 
copyright balance and explained that the utility of computer software 
made protection necessary: 
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In practice, the relative economic importance of the different rights comprising a 
copyright depends very much on the nature of the protected material and on the 
technology available for its exploitation. Thus, in achieving an optimum balance 
between the interests of creators and users of copyright materials, it is necessary to 
have regard to technological factors. 
The technology in question, computer software, demanded that the 
interests of the computer industry be given full weight. Evans did not 
speak of the US computer industry, which stood behind developments 
on the local scene, and instead gave rein to suppositions about local 
industry development that were probably suggested to his department 
by John Button and Barry Jones. Through their portfolios, Button and 
Jones promoted the development of national industry and scientific 
research, fuelling visions of indigenous technology development that 
next found expression in plans to create a native defence industry.  
Speaking in a new vernacular popularised by government economists, 
Evans linked recognition of copyright in software with efficiency and 
national competitiveness:  
It follows that the efficiency and competitiveness of Australian industry and 
commerce are in part dependent upon the availability of appropriate computer 
systems. Australia can best ensure this by fostering a strong capability for systems 
development. This capability needs to be able effectively to integrate locally developed 
(as well as imported) hardware and software to provide systems best suited to our 
requirements and which have the potential to be marketed overseas. A strong local 
software industry is an integral part of this capability. 
We are fortunate to have such an industry. Indeed the Australian computer software 
industry is internationally competitive and there are a growing number of 
organisations in this country whose main activities are software research and 
development. The industry is important in its own right and is capable of making a 
valuable contribution to the Government’s industrial development objectives. 
Evans wasted no time on the thorny issue of recognising computer 
code that might have no literal expression as a literary work. The 
possibilities for Australia created by investment, innovation and 
industry development, catchcries of a progressive new Government, 
supplied sufficient reason for action. If anyone thought otherwise, or 
argued against protection of software, said Evans, “the onus lay heavily 
upon those so contending to demonstrate why software should be 
treated differently from other technological developments.”  
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The opponents of the reforms, said Evans, failed to make their case. 
“The Government,” he declared, “has concluded that the onus was not 
met.” Nothing, it seemed, could justify throwing away the opportunity 
to support the creation of a booming Australian software industry: 
Copyright protection will stimulate innovation and further growth of Australia’s 
software industry and, to the extent international copyright conventions apply, ensure 
protection for exported software. 
Protection also has important consequences for users. There are risks of a 
withdrawal or limitation on the availability of imported software in the absence of 
copyright protection. Such a limitation would seriously jeopardise the viability of most 
local computer manufacturers since many obtain their systems’ software under licence 
from overseas’ suppliers. 
Evans’s last sentence supplied an unintended clue to Australia’s 
prospects as an internationally-recognised producer and exporter of 
software. Since the proprietary software used in Australia as the basis 
for “innovation and further growth”, and local adaptations, belonged to 
US licensors, Australian industry could only hope to play the role of 
creative subordinate to the giants of US software production.  
Whether the Australian computer industry fulfilled the hopes of Evans, 
Button or Jones is a matter for conjecture. What is certain is that his 
reforms made the Australian commercial environment safer for 
American business and presaged the new era of American dominance 
in Australian, and world, copyright affairs.  
 
